CONFIDENTIAL
SOVIET MIDDLE EAST POLICY
1. On 1 October Tass published the text of a Soviet proposal which has been presented to the United States, Egypt, Syria, Jordan, Israel and the leadership of the PLO for the reconvening of the Geneva Middle East Peace Conference in October or November of this year. The Soviet ideas on an agenda were, for the most part, very familiar; the withdrawal of Israel's troops from all Arab territories occupied in 1967; implementation of Palestinian rights, including their right to self-determination and the creation of their own state; and intemational guarantees for the independent existence of all states in the area. The new feature was the inclusion of a fourth item, the cessation of the state of war between the relevant Arab countries and Israel. The proposal reaffirmed Soviet support for holding the Conference in two stages - a preparatory stage in which procedural problems should be tackled, and a second main stage which would concentrate on matters of substance. The Russians are apparently also still insisting that the PLO should take part in the Geneva Conference from the outset, but have made no constructive suggestion about how this could be achieved to the satisfaction of all the parties concerned.
2.
The only reference to the Lebanon in the latest proposal is the suggestion that it would be easier to solve the Lebanon's problems in the context of a general Middle East settlement or of serious efforts towards such a settlement. The conflict in the Lebanon between the Syrians and the Palestinian/left wing alliance continues to place the Soviet Union in an acute dilemma. On the one hand the Russians attach importance to maintaining their commitment to the Palestinians, in whom they have made considerable political investment; on the other hand they cannot afford to alienate Syria, the only state directly involved in the Arab/Israel confrontation in which the Russians retain any influence. The Soviet Union's reaction to this dilemma has been to leave little doubt, in public comment, of their disapproval of Syria's policies, while in private - according to persistent rumour putting a limited degree of pressure on Syria over economic co-operation and military supplies to encourage her to change them. This policy has antagonised the Syrians, while its lack of success has inevitably failed to satisfy the Palestinians. An article in Pravda on 8 September marked a change of emphasis in Soviet public comment. While repeating Soviet criticism of the Syrian intervention in the Lebanon, it also for the first time criticised the obduracy of some Palestinian and Lebanese left-wingers. The Russians are probably now urging both sides to effect a compromise.
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3. The proposal of 1 October, which sought to focus attention on the broader issue of the Arab-Israel dispute, should probably be seen as an attempt to create a semblance of activity in a situation where the Russians find themselves on the sidelines, to remind the world of the Soviet role as co-Chairman of the Geneva Conference, as well as to draw attention away from the continuing difficulties the Russians find in adopting a posture on the Lebanese crisis satisfactory to both the Syrians and the Palestinians. The suggested timing in the Soviet proposal
CONFIDENTIAL
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