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from other crops, but the farmers already growing it could not increase their production by very much. And the conservatism of the Phan farmer is more pronounced in the case of opium since it is a notoriously unreliable crop. (Some years the crop is so bad that the poppies are ploughed back into the ground.) the farmers seem to think of the rise and fall in prices in a similar way

something as incalculable as the weather, to be borne with stoicism.

And

This means that if the price goes up, many villagers will expect it to fall in the following year. And if the price falls for several years, many will go on stubbornly planting opium expecting an eventual rise. The result of a real depression in the price would be misery and starvation across considerable areas of Shan State.

8. The Shan State Army

Outside Shan State its hard to distinguish between the many armed groups which claim to be resistance forces. They all seem roughly equal in strength and all aspire to some sort of revolutionary ideal. Inside Shan State, however, they can be judged on the way they treat the villagers, raise their finances, and administer their areas. On these grounds the S.S.A. is by far and away the most respected and idealistic political force in the country.

The armies of the other national groups Ba 0, Kayah, Kachin, Karen all maintain liaison officers or regular contact with the S.S.A., and tend to follow its lead in dealings with the Burmese. The Shan resistance group of Petkang and Kengtung which started and developed separately have adopted the name of the S.S.A. and follow its policy (except on local affairs). This is because the S.S.A. has the only political programme which can offer a reasoned alternative to the Burmese and the Communists, and they are the only group with the supra-local appeal to contest an election across Shan State.

What this means is that if a political settlement should even bring peace to Shan State, Narcotics agencies hoping to put an end to opium production would almost certainly have to deal with a government partly or wholly made up of the S.S.A. and its allies. (Even the Ka Kwa Ye are feudal groups with considerable local power). Obviously the S.S.A's attitude will be more favourable if approached

Later, it will have less to gain.

now.

ARGUMENTS FOR THE S.S.A. PROPOSALS

a.

Information

The main benefit offered by the proposals is information, which is difficult to get because of the Burmese cordon round the rebel areas. With the help of the S.S.A. and the Ka Kwa Ye it should be possible to produce in one or two years a detailed survey on which a long term solution could be based. Even if agreement with the Shans should then break down, this information would presumably be useful to the anti-narcotics campaign along the Thai border.

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Po far as we can tell, the S.S.A. and the Ka Kwa Ye are genuinely prepared to take any form of agent, complete with wireless transmitter and independent escort (if required) anywhere in Shan State.

b. Buying of Opium

Buying opium is a retrograde step and was included in the S.S.A. proposals only as a method of paying the resistance forces for their information and facilities. Other methods would probably be acceptable to the S.S.A., but there are several subsidiary advantages which might make buying worth considering:-

two

1. If 400 tons of Shan opium was taken off the market for

three years, presumably it would put out of business or

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