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times, secretly met several Ka Kwa Ye groups and spent some time trying to film the convoys. The S.S.A. estimate was that over 200 tons of opium moved down the Namlau route between June 1972 and January 1973, and they hoped that they could find some way of taxing it. (Appendix H - Namlau agents record of convoys. Appendix I critical estimate of convoys incorporating the agents figures.)
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Agreement with S.U.A. to tax Opium Convoys
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Until 1969, the Shan United Army based on Loi Maw and led by Kun Sar (Appendix J the S.U.A.) was the largest Ka Kwa Ye group escorting opium to Tachilek. But when Kun Sar was arrested in October 1969, his army of 1,100 men attacked the Burmese, formed an alliance
with the S.S.A. and started financing itself by levying a tax on opium convoys in the Tangyan region. (Appendix K S.U.A. tax accounts, promised but
A
not yet delivered.) In 1971 and 1972 they taxed over a hundred thousand viss* a year, and their Commander, Chang Shu Chuan (known usually as
Sar Mu Tsang) hoped to add to this the convoys of the largest Ka Kwa Ye group under Law Hsin Han. In October 1972 he trapped a Law Hsin Han convoy travelling up from Tachilek and confiscated 400 mules and their
(Another 130 mules belonging to the K.M.T. were returned
merchandise.
to them).
Shortly after this the S.U.A. came to a meeting with the S.S.A. at Mong La and persuaded the S.S.A. to help them trap Law Hsin Han's next convoy.
If they succeeded, Law Hsin Han's merchants would either desert or force him to pay the tax, and so the S.S.A. and S.U.A. could jointly tax all the opium from Wah State, Kokang and Northern Shan State at least 400 tons a year.
Estimate of Shan Opium Production.)
(Appendix L
Operation against Law Hsin Han
a.
On January 14th, 1973 a convoy of 804 mules (200 branched off later at Mong Ping) escorted by 500 of Law Hsin Han's men set out from Tachilek. From that time S.S.A/S.U.A. joint Headquarters received daily reports from agents or units with wireless sets scattered along the route. (The S.U.A. used 40 sets for the operation.)
b.
During the operation Commander Chang and Kun Siang for the S.U.A., and Col. Hso Lein and Lt.Col. Sam Mong for the S.S.A., formed a joint Headquarters, but decisions were nearly always dictated by Commander Chang's 10 years' experience in defending and attacking convoys. (He commanded the famous convoy destroyed in 1967 on the Burma-Laos border by a joint No.3 and No.5 K.M.T. force.)
Commander Chang believed north to meet the
C. From his knowledge of Law Hein Han, that an opium convoy would move down from the merchandise convoy coming up from the south. The southern convoy would then take the opium back to Tachilek and the northern convoy would return to Lashio with the merchandise. He also thought Law Hsin Han would send a convoy of trucks down the main Hsipaw-Laikha road about 40 miles to the west of us. If the S.U.A./S.S.A. attacked the trucks, this would divert troops from the force attacking the mules.
If they ignored the trucks, then the trucks, at least, would get through.
a.
To counter this, Commander Chang divided his 1,100 men into 4 groups blocking the 4 possible routes Law Hsin Han could use. The S.S.A. provided not more than an additional 2-300 men, but they supplied all the rice, and when needed a thousand villagers to dig
G
half a dozen entrenched positions.
* 1 viss = 3.6 lbs