2. Mr Train said that Messrs Cowell and Woolf were meeting leaders of the Shan State Army to discuss possibilities this week. Mr Cowell had said that he thought that the US Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) were now more receptive to his idea as, he had been led to believe, also was Hong Kong. Mr Train understood that Mr Cowell might also call in on Hong Kong to discuss the merits of his proposals.
3. Mr Goldsmith said that pre-emptive buying had been sugges- ted before but the DEA had turned it down as impracticable. He considered that this would still be the case. The US Government would not wish to offend Burmese sensibilities by dealing direct with the Shan State Army and Burma would con- sider any official contact with the Shan State Army or any other dissident group as flagrant interference with their internal affairs. The Americans would not want this and certainly we and Hong Kong should not get involved. Mr Wotton agreed and said that he would telegraph Hong Kong to say that Mr Cowell might call but that we regarded his proposal as a non-starter. He added that he would instruct Rolph to be as noncommittal as possible though he thought that the meeting might be worth- while and informative in view of Cowell's wide knowledge of the Golden Triangle area. Mr Train had no reason to suppose that the DEA would not again pour cold water on the idea. rate only an estimated 20 per cent of American heroin came from the Far East and not all of that was from Burma and he doubted if they would want to spend large amounts of money on such a project.
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At any
Mr Maxey then asked how the UN should become involved. He thought that they too should stay clear of pre-emptive buying. Mr Train agreed and considered that they should limit their action to the individual country programmes which they had already started. He added that there was evidence of No.3 and No.4 heroin in the streets of Rangoon and the Burmese were well aware of this and much concerned and were for that reason the more likely to co-operate with the UN in any programmes they might suggest.
5. It was agreed that Mr Train should discuss the UK's doubts with Mr Rolph at the meeting of the UN Narcotics Commission in Geneva and seek to dissuade him from pressing for action that was likely to offend Burmese susceptibilities. He should also be alert to any initiatives that Mr Rolph might seek to generate unilaterally in the UN Secretariat.
United Nations Department
21 January 1975