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these two Applicants and that as one was excluded it was not safe
to include the other. In neither case was a further caution
administered before the questions were asked and in neither was
the purpose to clarify any ambiguity in the statement which had
just been recorded. It is said that the true reason for
distinguishing between the two Applicants was that the Crown's case against the second Applicant was weaker and the judge had set himself up as an arbitrator between the interests of the Crown and the interests of the accused persons. We find nothing in the ruling to support this allegation. There was a difference between the second and the fourth Applicants in that the fourth Applicant was only 161⁄2 years old at the time. In addition to
that, however, the learned judge expressly mentioned the manner in which the second Applicant gave his evidence and he said that by his demeanour this applicant satisfied him beyond doubt that the further statement was given without prompting. We take this to mean that the learned judge thought the improper questions really had very little effect upon the mind of the second Applicant and that no dictate of justice required him to exclude his statement. We cannot say that there was no ground upon which the judge could reasonably make the distinction which he did. Then it is submitted that the prejudicial effect of the second Applicant's statement greatly outweighed its probative value. The basis of that submission was, once again, that the statement was so inconsistent with the medical evidence. We do not think it was necessarily inconsistent, but in any event that would not be "prejudice" within the meaning of the principle. On the other hand, an admissible confession is always evidence of a most cogent kind and we see no merit in this argument.
Finally in relation to the statements it is said that it was wrong for the judge to give a positive direction to the jury that they could act upon a statement if they believed it to be true even though that statement was not proved to have been voluntary. This Court has emphasised before that the question for the jury (as distinct from the question to be decided by a judge upon the issue of admissibility) is whether the statement is true. It would be wrong for a judge to tell a jury that the voluntariness of a statement was not material to the question they had to decide, but the principle decided in CHAN Wei-keung v. Reg. 1967 A.C. 160 is not to be whittled down in the manner contended