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(a) unofficials are aware of options in the joint working party report and hence almost certainly understand that reduction to 4 garrison must be linked to possibility of local, reinforcement in addition to reinforcement from UK;
(b)
the revised assumption of a withdrawal from Brunei was of course the sole reason why the Chiefs of Staff were able to agree to reduction to 43, for so long as the battalion remains in Brunei;
(c) the Hong Kong force level position is to be reviewed prior to withdrawal from Brunei but there is no intention of asking Hong Kong to agree in advance to the inclusion of the Brunei battalion in the cost-sharing agreement.
(d) the draft MOU contains a clause providing for review if the garrison size should materially change.
(e)
there has been no public announcement of a withdrawal date from Brunei and consultations with the Sultan are incomplete.
(f)
the Sultan has not been told of OPD's endorsement of the planning assumptions that withdrawal should be deferred until 1978.
(g)
the battalion in Brunei is by existing agreement available for worldwide deployment and the Sultan can reasonably be assumed to know or at least to guess that it has a role in Hong Kong reinforcement plans.
6. The conclusions must be firstly that there is no way in which the local reinforcement option can escape mention in dealing with the unofficials and secondly that this should as far as possible be managed in such a way as to avoid disclosing our position to the Sultan and thereby strengthening his bargaining hand. Our opening position as regards para 6 of the telegram might therefore be that the decision to reduce to 4 was based on the assurance of reinforcement from the UK with the option of local reinforcement/if an emergency developedwithout warning. If pressed in negotiations for a guarantee of local reinforcement throughout the whole period (say 5 years) of the Hong Kong cost sharing agreement we would have to admit that the position could change but that the situation as regards the threat and the forces available to meet it would then be considered jointly with Hong Kong in the context of the agreement, and that we were not seeking now to anticipate the outcome of such considerations. I should be grateful for confirmation that the above formula is adequate and acceptable in the wider context.
one
7. In view of the need to send an early reply, and come as complete as possible, I should be grateful for answers to this minute by close of play Thursday 25 September.
CODE 18-77
September 1975
SICKET TATENS A Sheper
A JH WARD DS6
MB Ext 2241
Page 120Page 121