T
SECRET UK EYES A
battalion should be retained until 1981;
DP Note 212/75(Final) (Continued)
the UK position is that it should be withdrawn by mid 1978, and, for political reasons, this has been related to requirements in Hong Kong and elsewhere. The number of infantry battalions stationed in Hong Kong and the composition of the force will require review prior to the withdrawal of the Brunei battalion. The negotiations with the Hong Kong Government should therefore take account both of the financial
implications of moving the Gurkha battalion to Hong Kong on withdrawal from Brunei, should the threat assessment and other
factors then make this necessary, and of the need to avoid openly undermining the arguments we have used with the Sultan.
Essential Elements
10. We endorse the Working Party's assessment of the essential elements of the garrison and agree that the naval presence should consist of a frigate. This latter view was confirmed by the Governor following consultations with the Unofficial Members of the Executive and Legislatave Councils (14). We also agree that the engineer capability should take the form of one Gurkha engineer field squadron with its associated training wing. latter would provide the equivalent of an additional infantry company in the IS role.
Stationed Infantry Force
11.
This
We agree with the Working Party's continued use of 5 infantry battalions and 2 sub-units as a yardstick for IS deployment planning in Hong Kong, and in the absence of financial constraints would have preferred a stationed infantry force of 5 battalions. This view is shared by the Governor (6) and CBFHK (11). However we consider it unrealistic under existing financial pressures to
Notes:
6. 11.
14.
D/MIN/WR/8/7 of 10 April 1975. CBFHK's RTT 2004002 March 1975. HONG KONG TEL 304 of 1 April 1975.
- 5-
SECRET UK EYES A
I