SECRET UK EYES A
DP Note 212/75(Final) (Continued)
d. Ministers are being asked (9) to agree as a planning assumption that the Gurkha battalion should remain in Brunei at least until mid-1978, rather than be withdrawn in 1976.
THE WORKING PARTY REPORT
4.
The Governor (10), CBFHK (11), and the Service Departments are generally content with the report. The interpretation of the threat has been examined (12) by the Assessments Staff; it is considered generally satisfactory and that no new JIC assessment is necessary. The Assessments Staff have drawn attention to an important difference between the situation now and that existing in 1967, namely that the Chinese Government have given priority to policies of stability and economic development at home, with the result that manifestations of popular disorder, such as might have implications for Hong Kong, are quickly suppressed.
5. The report does not recommend any particular composition of the garrison, but discusses its essential elements and the advantages, disadvantages and implications of four options which broadly meet the financial criteria. The Working Party concluded that, although an all-Gurkha infantry force has strong financial attractions, political and security arguments make essential the inclusion in the infantry force of at least 1 UK battalion. It identified the other essential elements as an engineer capability, a naval presence and 8 Wessex helicopters. Assuming a frigate and an adequate infantry force the Working Party also considered 3 RN patrol craft and an artillery battery to be further desirable
elements.
Notes:
9.
10.
OPD Paper in course of preparation.
HONG KONG TEL NO 257 of 17 March 1975.
11.
CBFHK's RTT 2004002 March 1975.
12.
Ja 0717 of 17 April 1975.
る。
SECRET UK EYES A
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