DAVIDI
A
1
The up acted ther
fles
squadron, and a Naval presence. he report conluded, baxever, that maither the winery watter eer_the patrol eraft were
essential componenter of tin courteen, chehough they were
ti
Bonetirguses highly desirablen ward, wobei bhakta Bosh.ofitiro garrisonexudid bonjatzfar then wroduced 48 one of thez battalázası vere
stationedraxtaúde Hong Kong, but-available Dorped geinforcementi
Invergorod of monenseringnauoted to pracode: then vorstida8st
threat. The Chiefs of Staff have endorsed these conclusions and
consider that the Naval presence should comprise the frigate and
the engineer presence a field squadron and its training wing. They also consider, in the new situation of deferred withdrawal
from Brunei, that for so long as a battalion remains in Brunei
as local reinforcement, (until mid 1978 on present assumptions),
with slower reinforcement available from UK, the garrison in Hong Kong need include only 4 stationed infantry battalions. The
continued presence of the patrol boats and the artillery battery
pressures would have military advantages but, with current preserves on the
Defence Budget, the Chiefs of Staff agree with the report that
these cannot be justified as essential.
If the Hong Kong Govt.
х press for inclusion of these terms they would have to bear the
full cost. The garrison resulting from this assessment is shown
wel at Annex A and costs £33.5m. It is acceptable to the Governor.
But it involves increased risk; the position will have to be
reviewed prior ro the withdrawal of the battalion from Brunei,
and the threat kept under regular review.
х
X
3.
The Hong Kong Contribution
The Governor has taken informal soundings of the unofficial
members of the Hong Kong Government and has reported that his
earlier view roraing valid that the maximum that Hong Kong can
SECRET UK EYES A