(DEFENCE AND EXTERNAL AFFAIRS SUB-COMMITTEE)
February, 1975.] Mr. A. P. HOCKADAY, C.B., C.M.G.,
[Continued.
Rear Admiral A. S. MORTON, Mr. T. CULLEN, Mr. D. M. EVANS, Mr. G. C. B. DODDS, Mr. A. R. M. JAFFRAY, Mr. J. D. BRYARS and Mr. T. C. G. JAMES, C.M.G.
work, and sometimes in a bilateral or trilateral framework, for example with the French or with the Germans and the Italians. We think we are moving towards it. We have had one or two disappointments but the intention is there and we hope that we are making some progress which will bear rather more fruit in the next decade or so.
154. Do you really think that is so, or is that what is hoped for?----I would say that there are a considerable number of areas in which we have advanced on the collaborative road with various part- ners. We hope that they will come to fruition. One cannot say for certain whether they will or not until you have got right through the process.
Mr. Roper.
155. In the light of that, what might happen over the next ten years? I saw a recent statement that the equipment of European air forces will be less stan- dardised in 1985 than it is today or was in the 1950s and 1960s. Is that true, and is that really because we have not had sufficient collaboration in the last five years? (Mr. James.) You were kind enough to give us notice that this might come up and we have been trying to get some sort of judgment of this. It is ex- tremely difficult. This is a very broad generalisation that I am going to offer you which is that certainly as between the mid-1950s, the mid-1960s and the mid-1970s, which is where we are at the present time, the position has been very much the same. The question therefore is, is it going to get any better? If we try to look ahead to 1985, what will the position be then? Will it be an improve- ment or otherwise? We do believe that there are real grounds for thinking that the NATO inventory in 1985 will be more streamlined than it is at the present time. We would think that the main air- craft in, for example, the crucial central region would be four or five which really would bear the heat and burden of the day, the MRCA, whatever it is that replaces the F104 and the F15; we will at that time, of course, be moving to- wards a replacement of close support air- craft like the Harriers and Jaguar, and this in particular is an area where we really must hope to produce a replace-
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ment on a collaborative basis with all the advantages which this gives one in terms of operations, inter-operability, logistics, and so forth.
156. You say we must, but the sug- gestion that I saw, which again was from a recent Adelphi paper, was that in fact because of decisions taken over the last five years, although this might come after 1985, by 1985 the situation is likely to be worse than it is today rather than better?
By 1985 we trust the MRCA will be in large scale service. The F104 replacement should equally be in service at that time. These are two useful pointers to 1985 perhaps being a rather better situation than the past.
157. This is making the assumption the F104 replacement will be the same aircraft as that being used by the Americans?
It is making that assumption and I think it shows the complications of the problem that one can equally respectably assume from an operational point of view that the re- placement of the F104 could be not one but two aeroplanes.
Dr. Miller.
158. I am trying to make a quick assessment about R & D expenditure. Do I take it once the deductions have been effected the proportion spent on R & D will be roughly the same as the proportion at the moment, or will it be a little more? (Mr. Hockaday.) It will be roughly the same.
Dr. Miller.] This is very important because possibly research and develop- ment play an even greater role in defence than the actual production and sales since if you have an emergency, if you have got the research and develop- ment done you can perhaps swing into action, whereas if you have no research and development you will be in some difficulty.
Chairman.
159. You talk in paragraph 36 about saving on development then say you do not really intend to do a short term cut in the well advanced projects but to find savings from more distant projects on which little or nothing has yet been