54
MINUTES OF EVIDENCE TAKEN BEFORE THE EXPENDITURE COMMITTEE
11 February, 1975.]
[Continued.
Answer
1. The information is as follows:
£Million 1974 Survey Prices
1975-76
1976-77
1977-78
نن فنه
a.
Reassessment (b)
- 12.2
33.4
115
b.
Manpower (a)
22
24.1
22.9
C.
Northern Ireland (a)
33.4
31.9
29.1
d. Accounting Adjustment (a)
28
45
71.2
134.4 !
167
2. These adjustments were made in the normal course of finalising LTC 74, a process which was completed in February/March before the initiation of the Defence Review. No subsequent changes were made, either to the early or the later years. Notes
(a) The adjustments in lines 2-4 are foreshadowed in para. 4 on page 19 of Cmnd.
5519 for the years 1975-76—1977-78.
(b) Line 1 reflects the updated assessment of the estimated cost of the previous Defence programme. For 1977-78, the figure in Cmnd. 5519 was provisional. Line 1 also includes certain items of expenditure included in the Defence Budget for other than Defence reasons, e.g. the cost of measures to aid employment, which were allowed to be identified over and above target: see Annex A, Table 1 of the 1973 Defence White Paper (Cmnd. 5231).
DEFENCE REVIEW (D.51)
Supplementary Memorandum by the Ministry of Defence (S.C.O.E. 70/3) The attached papers are provided in response to the five questions in the letter from the Clerk to the Sub-Committee dated 12 February, 1975. They are as follows:
Annex A
Annex B
Annex C
Annex D
R.A.F. Transport Force and Civil Airline Resources. Civilian Manpower Reduction: Locally Entered Civilians. Estimated Costs of Lost Employment Opportunities.
HM Dockyards-Present Capacity and Workload and Effect of Defence Review.
Annex E Effect of Reducing the Defence Budget by £1,000 million p.a.
ANNEX A DEFENCE REVIEW-RAF TRANSPORT FORCE AND CIVIL AIRLINE RESOURCES Background
1. The RAF Air Transport Force of the current size and composition derives from developments in post-war policy which led to the reduction of garrison forces overseas, coupled with the creation in the UK of a mobile Stategic Reserve. It was consistent with the primary task of training with and deploying the Strategic Reserve that the Force should be used in peacetime for the routine support of overscas theatres, including trooping of personnel and dependents and the carriage of freight for all three Services.
2. In circumstances in which the Force became heavily engaged in peacetime on its primary Strategic Reserve role or special emergency tasks and was, as a result, unable to meet its routine support commitments, a range of alleviating measures could be applied, e.g., cancellation of deferment of lower priority exercises involving air transport effort, re-routing of passengers or freight through scheduled civil services, or ad hoc air charter. These arrangements have led to close contacts between the RAF and the commercial air carrires, both National and Independent. Against this background the answers to the Sub-Committee's questions are: —
Question IA What contingency plans exist for the use of surplus capacity on civil airlines to supplement the reduced RAF Transport Force?