(DEFENCE AND EXTERNAL AFFAIRS SUB-COMMITTEE)
4 February, 1975.]
Mr. A. P. HOCKADAY, C.B., C.M.G., Mr. T. CULLEN, Mr. D. M. EVANS, Mr. G. C. B. Dodds, and Rear Admiral A. S. MORTON.
Chairman.
106. We went down and saw these heli- copters which were flying in the anti- tank missile role. They are being cut back, are they not, by this review? Yes. The numbers are given in para- graph 23.
Chairman.] We were very impressed with them. That is all I would like to say about this form of defence.
Mr. Roper.
107. There are very substantial reduc- tions: the * * * that were being bought will be reduced to * * *?. -Yes.
108. What are the implications of that with regard to our contribution to the Alliance's anti-tank strategy? Could I ask that in light of the fact that it may be cheaper to buy anti-tank weapons than to buy tanks? (Rear Admiral Morton.) All the studies that have been conducted show that you require a balanced force and a mix. It may be cheaper to buy anti-tank weapons, but we cannot do without a proportion of tanks. The reduction in the number of helicopters, subject to specialist evidence, is part of adjusting the overall anti- tank potential of the structure of the Army in Germany.
109. Will the reduction in helicopters be compensated for by the provision of other forms of anti-tank weaponry? I would like to go further and say that the combat capability overall of the British Army of the Rhine in the anti- tank field will be improved. The over- all capability is going to be improved in the next few years.
110. Which suggests there will be a compensating increase in other weapons?
-Well . .
111. Or more effective use of weapons?
I think maybe that.
Chairman.
112. With regard to the effective corn- bat strength of the Army, the fighting troops, how much is coming off the combat brigade, if any? We have heard about the mobile reserve. We are actually taking away from the teeth of the Army in these manpower cuts?- ~(Mr. Hocka-
[Continued.
47
day.) The intention is that the combat capability should be reduced as little as possible. You have referred to the specialist reinforcement capability which, of course, has consisted of relatively lightly armed formations which have never been equipped to the same stan- dards as those to which, for example, Rhine Army is equipped. It is the intention that the combat capability of Rhine Army shall be in no way reduced as a result of the measures that are being undertaken.
113. When we go to the Rhine Army in a couple of months and say to the Commander-in-Chief, "Has this review made any difference?", will he explode? You do not think he will? -I do not think he will, Sir. I take that as much in jest as Dr. Miller's earlier remark about the Scottish Navy.
Mr. Roper.
114. On the question of the savings in general, we have the rather mysterious item in Annex A at No. 14 on Chieftain. Could we have some indication of what the implications are for the Chieftain on which there will be some savings?
-There will be some information on this in the memorandum for which you have asked by tomorrow. I can, in fact, lift the veil to the extent of indicat- ing that we shall be telling you that on Chieftain the estimated saving during the review period is * * and it will be
*
spread over the period from *
*
*
*
*
*
to
115. Could we be given some idea as to what percentage
* * is of the total expenditure on Chieftain over that period? I cannot answer offhand.
116. It would be helpful if a percentage could be appended to the memorandum when it reaches us? -We will see what we can say in that regard.
I
117. Then there are anti-tank missiles which we have not really discussed. see the Canadians have decided to select TOW as their anti-tank missile. How far have we got in our selection process?
-We have not yet made a selection.
118. Are we likely to do so in the fore- seeable future? Yes. I am just won- dering how far Mr. Roper is foreseeing,