46
MINUTES OF EVIDENCE TAKEN BEFORE THE EXPENDITURE COMMITTEE
4 February, 1975.] Mr. A. P. HOCKADAY, C.B., C.M.G.,
Mr. T. CULLEN, Mr. D. M. Evans, Mr. G. C. B. Dodds, and Rear Admiral A. S. MORTON.
of State's statement (the top of column 1355) was the reduction of afloat sup- port by one-third. That is what I call RFAS; perhaps it is something else?
-(Rear Admiral Morton.) That is
correct.
99. In Annex A items 3 to 6 all come into the category of afloat support, * Can I be told whether
*
*
this reduction is almost entirely as a re- sult of our withdrawal from areas out- side the NATO Commands or whether there are any other particular reasons for this reduction. What will be the aggre- gate savings and how much non-service manpower will thereby be released? Can I answer the simple question first and say that possibly I need notice of the detailed question? They are reduced as part of a concentration of our efforts in the Atlantic and the European area, and they are a direct product of that reduction. It is the overseas operations and the operations in the Mediterranean that require the increased afloat support.
100. So the reduction of a third will be reflected in the reduction in man- power among the RFA people and also considerable reduction in the procure- ment programme for these ships. Perhaps we could have some evidence on that next time. Secondly, the maritime Harrier of course, when we considered the cruiser programme we realised the cruiser could be obtained in various con- figurations, one of which would involve the acquisition of maritime Harriers. The alternative, of course, would require rather more Sea Kings on board the car- riers. Could the witnesses tell us what the present state of thinking is about the configuration in which the cruiser will eventually sail? (Mr. Hockaday.) The maritime Harrier occupies the same place in the programme as it did previ- ously; it is still the case that no deci- sion has yet been taken as to whether to proceed to full development of it.
101. Therefore, no decision has been taken as to the configuration on board the through-deck cruiser when it sails? (Rear Admiral Morton.) I think that follows.
Mr. Sandelson.
102. Following from an earlier ques- tion, would it be right to assume that the
66
[Continued.
Navy on its own would be in no posi- tion at all to defend British merchant shipping outside of NATO waters? I stress on its own "?. In the context of war, no, Sir. In the context of piracy and other such activities, I would think possibly yes.
Mr. Finsberg.
103. Would the protection of North Sea oil rigs and the like fall in that cate- gory?
The protection of North Sea oil rigs in war is a function of the Alliance and in peacetime we would, of course, expect to contribute to their pro- tection.
Dr. Miller.
104. The new Scottish Navy will deal with it. Mr. Chairman!?There is an HMS Jura about to be commissioned.
Chairman.] I understood you could only intervene when the Chief Constable of Aberdeen called you out.
Dr. Miller.] I hope that is recorded as a joke and not as a serious contribution to the defence of the United Kingdom.
Mr. Sandelson.] Do not worry. There was never any likelihood of a misunder- standing.
Mr. Roper.
105. Before we go off the record com- pletely, Mr. Chairman, there is a refer- ence to a review of the shore training and
support services in
in paragraph 20. Is there any estimate as to what sort of saving this will provide? Are the savings likely to be comparable to the amount you have been able to wring out of the RAF during its manpower review?
(Mr. Hockaday.) It is too early yet to attempt any precise sort of estimate of this. It is a critical review and we trust that we will get proportionate economies in the Navy shore support and training to those we are obtaining from the front line itself.
Chairman.] I believe we ought to try and take the Army now. I accept that we cannot do the Air Force today.
Sir Frederic Bennett.] I suggest we do not have any questions on 22. We have been through it very thoroughly, including Brunei.