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MINUTES OF EVIDENCE TAKEN BEFORE THE EXPENDITURE COMMITTEE
4 February, 1975.] Mr. A. P. HoCKADAY, C.B., C.M.G.,
Mr. T. CULLEN, Mr. D. M. EVANS, Mr. G. C. B. DODDS, and Rear Admiral A. S. MORTON.
Gibraltar. If, as has been suggested, Gibraltar were closed down as well, we would have no Western Mediterranean Nimrods. Would these be replaced by United Kingdom based Nimrods or other methods of dealing with anti-submarine warfare in the Western Mediterranean?
-It is part of our plan that we would withdraw our commitment of maritime patrol aircraft to the southern region and the Mediterranean after the expiry of the agreement with Malta. So we would, in fact, withdraw those forces from the southern region at that time to the United Kingdom and, because of various other equipment programmes, those forces would no longer be of service after that date.
62. This is, in fact, a significant reduc- tion in our contribution to NATO in that area? It is a reduction in the forces which we assign to the southern region for the support of Allied Command, Europe, in war.
63. For anti-submarine warfare?- For anti-submarine warfare.
Sir Frederic Bennett.
64. I know what was said about this being primarily a political and diplo- matic point, but does the continuance of Gibraltar depend to any extent from the purely service point of view on how long the Malta arrangements continue?- (Mr. Hockaday.) No. There is no direct link between the two. Both these points, Both these points, in fact, reflect the general philosophy that has governed our approach to our NATO commitments. We are rather on the borderline of the portion of the mem- orandum entitled "Outside NATO" and the subsequent portion of the memor- andum that is about NATO, but it is, I think, clear from the memorandum that our extra-NATO commitments would not, even if one closed them all down, produce economies of the order of magnitude that the Government judge to be required by the economic impera- tives. Consequently we have to look at our overall NATO effort and attempt a judgment of priority as to those portions of it which were most vital or least vital to our own security and to the contribution that this country makes to NATO's overall strategy. The judg- ment we formed was that in that context the quite small contribution we have
[Continuea.
been making in the Mediterranean was less integral and less vital than the con- tributions that we make on the central front, in the Eastern Atlantic and Channel areas, in reinforcement of the northern flank and with our nuclear capability.
Chairman
65. Following that, the Secretary of State was very firm on the central front and our commitments to NATO. But have we not lost mobility on our north- ern flank?—There is some reduction in reinforcement capability for the northern flank but we shall still have available our remaining specialist reinforcement force and also the commando specially trained and equipped to operate in arctic conditions.
Mr. Sandelson.
66. Could I revert to the question before the one just put? Are we to understand that we have really aban- doned any contribution in the Mediter- ranean area? If that be so, as I under- stand it to be so and not just from you gentlemen but by listening to political speeches, do you have a view as to how this country is, for instance, to pro- tect its oil supplies in certain circum- stances? -As Admiral Morton
indicated just now, we shall no longer be assigning forces to NATO for em- ployment under NATO command in war time. The reason for this has been simply that we did not regard our con- tribution to NATO in the Mediterranean as so vital to NATO strategy and defence posture as our own contribution in other areas, and it seemed to us that, whereas withdrawal of our quite substantial con- tributions in the other areas mentioned would have a very serious effect upon NATO's posture, within the Mediter- ranean the principal effort in support of NATO would continue to be borne, as it is now, by the United States and by the Mediterranean members of NATO themselves. The fact that we are not assigning forces to NATO for employ- ment under NATO command in war does not mean that we might not from time to time deploy forces into the Mediter- ranean in peacetime, but subject to the uncertainty of the future situation in Cyprus to which Mr. Roper referred a