24
MINUTES OF EVIDENCE TAKEN BEFORE THE EXPENDITURE COMMITTEE
4 February, 1975.]
[Continued.
8. It was decided to retain our forces in Hong Kong (albeit at a somewhat reduced level and with the firm intention of seeking a larger financial contribution from the Hong Kong Government), in Belize, the Falkland Islands and Gibraltar ; to make some early reductions in Cyprus; to make no changes in present circum- stances in the arrangements we have with the Sultan of Oman; and in general to withdraw from other areas except for Diego Garcia and the Integrated Air Defence System in Malaysia.
9. Oman: *
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10. Gan and Mauritius: Gan provides a staging post for aircraft and ships on route to the Far East. When we have withdrawn our forces from Singapore and Brunei, the cost of facilities at Gan (£2.7 million per annum) will no longer be justified, so we aim to withdraw *
* Diego Garcia will provide some alternative, if less convenient, facilities to those at Gan, to the extent that we still need them when our presence East of Suez has diminished. There are some extra costs in relying on Diega Garcia, but these are minimal compared with savings from withdrawal from Gan and Mauritius. The airfield at Gan con- tributes about £0.5 million per annum to the Maldivian economy- -mainly through the employment it offers to the local population. *
* Mauritius provides a naval communications station (HMS Mauritius) the cost of which, some £1.4 million per annum, with a reduced presence East of Suez, can no longer be justified. We propose to withdraw the personnel from there * The expansion of the existing communications facilities at Diego Garcia to which we already contribute some personnel, will offer us the chance of establishing at relatively low cost such alternative facilities as we need. HMS Mauritius contributes about £0.7 million to the local economy which also benefits substantially from British aid.
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11. *
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12. Cyprus: In Cyprus we expect to make reductions in the Forces stationed there, including the Vulcan Strike aircraft currently based at Akrotiri in support of CENTO. The nature of the reductions is subject to the outcome of the consulta- tions currently in progress with our Allies. In the meantime, in order to ease the severe accommodation problems within the Sovereign Base Areas which have resulted from the recent fighting in Cyprus, we are withdrawing the squadrons of Vulcan, Lightning and Hercules aircraft which have been based there and are replacing them with smaller roulement detachments of aircraft from the UK.
NATO AND THE UK Base
13. In examining our high priority NATO commitments, difficult choices in priorities had to be faced between our contribution to the Central Front, to maritime forces, to the flanks of NATO, to the Alliance's strategic nuclear deterrent and to the security of the UK Base. We took the view that the choice should be determined by our estimate of the military effectiveness of the forces which we could provide to the Alliance within our limited resources. We concluded that the effectiveness of our contribution to common defence on the flanks of NATO, and particularly on the Southern Flank, was of lower priority than our contribu- tion elsewhere. In general strategic terms it was therefore decided to concentrate our forces with equal priority on:-
(a) The Central Front, where the land and air forces of the Warsaw Pact pose a most serious threat to the stability of the Alliance; there will therefore be no reductions, in advance of MBFR, in the land forces we maintain in Germany or in the air forces, which are likewise governed by the Brussels Treaty commitment.