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SECOND REPORT FROM
EFFECTS ON THE SERVICES
20. The Secretary of State indicated on 3rd December 1974 that priority would be given to maintaining as far as possible the level and quality of our front-line forces. Nevertheless, we note that as well as reductions which flow naturally from the strategic changes outlined above, the review pro- posals include manpower reductions, which cannot be equated with reduced commitments, and deferments and cancellations of planned equipment purchases.
21. In the case of the Royal Navy, the Secretary of State announced sub- stantial reductions in the planned numbers of ships, the effect of which is to continue the sharp reduction in the size of the Fleet which has occurred in recent years. For example, the proposed reduction in the number of destroyers and frigates would bring the number down by one-seventh, result- ing in a force which would then be about half of the number in service in 1964. Mr. Greenwood thought the Navy may have been prepared to make sacrifices elsewhere in order to get its cruisers', and it is a fact that the very costly cruiser programme is to contine in its present form (Q.86). Naval manpower would be reduced by 5,000. We are glad to note that the proposals include a critical review of shore training and support.
22. In evidence, the Ministry admitted that the Navy, on its own, would be in no position to defend British merchant shipping outside NATO waters (Q.102). While this may have to be accepted, since it is impossible for economic reasons to guard against all contingencies, and indeed may re- present no substantial change from the pre-review situation, the Ministry were also rather diffident as to the Navy's ability in peacetime to deal with piracy and other such activities (Q.102). The overall reduction in naval forces reduces our national capability to go to the aid of British ships or installa- tions threatened with interference, and also our contribution to the inter- national capability for maintenance of good order at sea. The need to rescue British nationals from situations of danger such as the Cyprus emergency must also be taken into account. We therefore suggest that the progressive reduction in the Fleet and their added responsibility for protection of off- shore interests make it imperative that the Navy should strive to secure even more co-operation with other NATO Navies and in particular with other members of the Eurogroup. This could extend to adoption wherever possible of common designs of ships, equipment and weapon systems.
23. In the Army, something under one half of the proposed 12,000 man- power reduction is expected to flow from commitments outside NATO which are to be reduced or abandoned. We welcome the fact that the balance of the manpower saving is to be found by pruning command and support functions rather in the style of Phase II of the RAF manpower economy project3; the Ministry hope that this will improve the teeth: tail ratio and preserve front-line combat effectiveness. In addition, the Army will suffer cuts in planned provision of new equipment which will include cancel- lations, deferments and reductions in quantities ranging across the whole programme.
1 Evidence page 5, para. 14.
2 Evidence page 27, para. 21.
3 See First Report of the Expenditure Committee, H.C. (1974-75) 220, paras. 20-31.