THE EXPENDITURE COMMITTEE
xi
additional aid is granted, the cost of such additional aid together with the extra costs at Diego Garcia will not exceed the costs of maintaining forces at Gan and Mauritius, and that this aspect of the arrangements will be fully explored by the Ministry of Defence, the Foreign and Commonwealth Office and the Ministry of Overseas Development.
Within NATO
16. The Ministry decided that the highest priorities within NATO should be accorded equally to the Central Front in Europe; to defence of the Eastern Atlantic and Channel; to the security of the United Kingdom home base; and to maintenance of the nuclear deterrent1. The proposed reduc- tions directly affecting NATO fall mainly on those of our forces which would be assigned to the Mediterranean in war and on specialist reinforce- ment forces.
17. In effect, it is proposed that we shall no longer be earmarking forces for deployment under NATO command in the Mediterranean in wartime (Q.166). These reductions mainly affect anti-submarine capabilities. Our commitment of Nimrod maritime patrol aircraft to the area would be with- drawn after expiry in 1979 of the agreement for stationing our forces in Malta (Q.60). There would be reductions in our force declarations to NATO in the Mediterranean of destroyers, frigates and mine counter-measure vessels2. The Ministry considered that the principal effort in support of NATO in that area would continue to be borne by the United States and by the Medi- terranean members of NATO themselves (Q.66).
18. In the case of specialist reinforcement forces at present available to NATO significant reductions are proposed. The existing commando ships would be phased out as such in 1976 and would not be replaced, the assault ships would remain in service but with only one ship at immediate readiness, and the commando group in Malta would be disbanded on withdrawal in 1979. The commitment to air drop two parachute battalions would be abandoned, together with the supporting arms and services and air transport; a limited parachute capability would be retained but the exact size or role of the force envisaged had not yet been determined". Finally, the United Kingdom Mobile Force would be reduced by 1979 from three airportable brigades to one, but with an improved level of support equipment; it would be available for deployment to the Central and Northern Regions only.
19. The period following the 1967-68 defence review and the adoption of the strategy of flexible response by the Alliance has seen considerably more emphasis on mobile forces and reinforcement capabilities in NATO. In this field, the United Kingdom has hitherto given a lead amongst the European partners. The review proposals will tend to reverse this trend and therefore reduce the options open to NATO Ministers at the lower levels of strategic escalation. While the commitment to the Central Front is to be maintained, the cuts affecting mobility, support and reinforcement capability will have a weakening effect on both the Northern and Southern flanks.
1 Evidence pages 24-25, para. 13.
2 Evidence page 26, para. 16.
3 Evidence pages 25-26, para. 14.
• See Evidence page 11, Q.5.