CONFIDENTIAL CONFIDENPH
20.
In assessing the threat to Britain's security both military and
political aspects must be considered. In parallel with its stated
policy of detente the Warsaw Pact maintains forces on the mainland
of Europe which are increasing in strength and capability and are
far larger than are necessary for defence or for garrison duties.
They are composed, equipped and deployed in a manner appropriate to
offensive rather than defensive operations.
The Soviet Union has
vastly expanded its Navy and can rapidly deploy substantial naval
forces across the maritime lines of communication between Europe and
North America. On the evidence of its national defence policies
and its approach to international negotiations, the objectives of
the Soviet Union are at least to achieve parity with the West in areas
in which it has in the past been inferior. Chapter II paragraphs 2-9
and figs. 2 and 3 give some details of the military threat and current
imbalances of forces between NATO and the Warsaw Pact. There is no
reason to suppose that the Warsaw Pact is contemplating outright
aggression against the West; but this is a political judgement which
neither alters the military facts nor necessarily holds good for ever.
21. Detente is not irreversible. It could be brought to an end after
having served a limited purpose, or it could develop into something
more permanent and comprehensive. In common with its Allies, the
Government is working to establish a safer and more productive
relationship with the Soviet Union and its Allies. But until detente
is clearly established upon a lasting foundation of mutual security,
we must take a cautious view of the intentions of the Warsaw Pact,
including the possibility that it may try to use its massive military
power, especially in conventional weapons, to bring political pressure
perhaps selectively on Western countries in the hope of
influencing their external, and perhaps even more their domestic,
to bear
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CONFIDENTIAL