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would be our preferred wording, and the Secretary of State may wish to work for it as a compromise
solution.
Oman (para. 3 (c))
If Mr Mason should require support on Oman, the Secretary
of State might reiterate that in present circumstances any change in our arrangements with the Sultan would be unsound politically in terms of the prosecution of the Dhofar War, our relations with the Sultan, Iran and Saudi Arabia and the United
States' representations about our continued presence in Masirah. Any premature move could cause us political harm in an area which is vital to our economic interests. This applies to Masirah
as well as to our direct assistance. We shall of course continue to keep the level of our military assistance to Oman under regular review with the intention of reducing it as and when we
can.
Brunei (para. 3 (d))
The talks with the sultan begin on 25 February. It is already clear that he will object to the decision to withdraw
the battalion and for this if no other reason the negotiations
with him are likely to be protracted.
The Treasury are also concerned about the possibility of financial retaliation by the Brunei Government. Although we have no evidence that this is the Sultan's intention, the Brunei negotiators could threaten diversification of their sterling reserves as a bargaining counter. In such circumstances the withdrawal of the battalion might not be possible. present wording of the passage on Brunei in para. 37 of the White Paper has already been amended to take account of the
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