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permanent, and Mr Healey could press for the Committee to take the further paper before anything more is said to the Americans about our future force levels in the island. The Secretary of State need not oppose this.
Mr Healey may similarly insist that the White Paper should not imply that we shall stay in Cyprus indefinitely. He may question Mr Mason's proposed wording (Chapter 1, para. 40), viz "We propose in present circumstances to retain forces in Cyprus, though at reduced strength....."
This
goes slightly further than Ministers have hitherto gone in the House (Mr Mason said on 3 December only that "In Cyprus we intend to make some early reductions") but it is acceptable to us.
e.g.
However, Mr Healey may press for something less positive,
(i) the addition of "The present arrangements relate only to present circumstances." This would not be acceptable to us. The Americans would think it ran counter to the assurances we have given them. It could encourage both Greek and Turkish Cypriots to try to push us out at a time not of our choosing. And it would expose us to considerable criticism from all those interested in a Cyprus settlement; they would suspect (and perhaps accuse) us of being about to wash our hands of the problem.
(ii) the omission of any statement about our long-term
intentions so that the White Paper would refer only to the intended reductions described in the rest of para. 40 of the draft White Paper.
This
/would
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