SECRET 高度機密
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than 5 2/3 rds was worth having at all. H.D., emphasising that he was deliberately speaking without having consulted C.B.F., said that the view of officials in Hong Kong is that it would be worth having, and that a 42/3 rds garrison would be a very useful stabilising force, in dealing with internal security situations, and also countering minor incidents on the border which were not supported by Peking.
4.
If it is agreed that a 4 2/3rds garrison is a worthwhile second best, the mix must also be considered, including the question of whether it should be 4 Gurkha battalions or 3 Gurkha and 1 UK unit. H.E. said that if the views of the H.K. Government were sought on this he would have to consult both the Commissioner of Police (who returns from leave on 3.2.75), and the Commander British Forces. However the following factors would have to be taken into account:-
5.
(a)
(b)
the psychological effect on the R.H.K.P.F. and the Hong Kong public of an all Gurkha teeth arm force.
The effect on the Gurkha soldiers themselves, of operating
in a situation isolated from the British army and with no prospects of serving outside Hong Kong.
His Excellency thought that a 4 2/3 rds garrisons' cost would be about £35/36 m. Clearance should therefore be obtained to work out what the cost and composition of a 42/3 rds garrison would be.
6. His Excellency's subjective guess in the summer of 1974 was that £17 m. would be the maximum sum that the Executive and Legislative Councils would accept, and this sum reflected the biggest increase the Hong Kong Government had ever made to Defence costs. His Excellency in an October 1974 telegram to the F.C.O. had mentioned a total overall financial provision of £27 m. and 75% of that was about £20 m. However there was little or no pressure that could be applied to the Councils, and the Financial Secretary had already explained the current financial circumstances, which are infinitely gloomier now than they were last summer or autumn. Whereas His Excellency at that time was reasonably confident that £17 m. would be accepted, His Excellency was now by no means as confident but he was still prepared to have a shot at it.
7. The even more difficult budgetary situation now emerging rendered the 75% increases proposed by the British Government impossible. His Excellency had suggested a cost apportionment of 50/50 - and this might prove to be the right solution eventually as representing the maximum increase that Hong Kong could accept at one time and being possible to present. Moreover it was a fact that doubling our present contribution and halving that of the U.K. and arriving at a 50/50 split is compatible with Mr. Mason's statement in the House of Commons. And it has an extremely important additional implication in that nobody in Hong Kong could claim that as the major contributor Hong Kong should have the dominant voice on detail and standards.
8. If the United Kingdom nevertheless attached importance to obtaining a high percentage contribution as a matter of principle, then it might be possible to consider Hong Kong eventually paying more than 50%, provided Hong Kong could pay less at first. This had attractions because of the difficult
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SECRET 高度機密
/ budgetry