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(e) The advice we are to give the Secretary of State on
what he should say to the Chinese about Hong Kong requires some thought. We would welcome the Governor's views. We think the subject can scarcely be avoided but any frank discussion would be premature and there is perhaps a risk that the Chinese, for ideological reasons, could be provoked into declaring an interest in the early resumption of sovereignty at whatever cost to them economically and politically. We also think it very important that he should not leave the Chinese with any impression of an impending change in British policy e.g. by engaging them in discussion of the internal affairs of Hong Kong or by suggesting their cooperation in its administration.
(f) Perhaps it would be sufficient for him to note with
satisfaction the present cooperative attitude on both sides over Hong Kong with an indication that this is welcome to HMG. He could add that Hong Kong has on occasion given rise to difficulties in Anglo/Chinese relations but the present cooperative attitude had worked out well for both. le might also say that Hong Kong was actively encouraging the development of adequate social conditions for the population and needed the cooperation of all in the furtherance of this object. We would judge that the Chinese would be unlikely to comment substantially on such observations but they may assist in maintaining the present satisfactory working relationship with unofficial Chinese representatives in Hong Kong.
(g) We are also considering what should be said if the
Chinese renew their request for an official
representative in Hong Kong. Conceding such a point would in our view risk destabilising effects in the Colony. The Chinese would doubtless say that this fear was unreal because the functions of such a representative could be carefully defined to avoid misinterpretation. We think that terms of reference would be very difficult
to devise.
/(h)