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(e)
that the longer term prospects of Chinese tolerance are problematical given that the practical interest may diminish in importance; that ideological considerations may prevail; and that political stability in China cannot be guaranteed;
(f) that peaceful transference of power at some time in
(g)
(h)
(i)
(j)
arguably
the future might, avoid the risks of a débâcle but that any outward manifestation that an agreement to this effect had been reached would quickly erode stability in the Colony and provoke a premature Chinese
takeover;
that we cannot ignore the problem indefinitely since the confidence of investors will begin to decline as
1997 approaches and we will, therefore, need to seek a clarification of Chinese attitudes, probably in the early 1980s;
that there seems little point in seeking some under- standing with China until the disappearance of Mao and Chou and the emergence of a new generation of Chinese
leaders;
that a frank discussion with the Chinese during the Secretary of State's visit next year would be premature and might indeed provoke the Chinese for ideological reasons to declare an interest in early resumption of sovereignty over Hong Kong at whatever cost to them economically and politically;
that it would be crucially important for the Secretary of State not to leave the Chinese with any impression of an impending change of British policy e.g. by engaging them in discussion of the internal affairs of Hong Kong or by suggesting their cooperation in its administration (an idea with which he has been toying); (k) that such moves could only be safely undertaken if and
when we ourselves have decided that our best interests
lie in handing back the Colony: to make them before then would be to lose strategic control of the problem.
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13.
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