Mr Champion
Mr Duff
Mr Preston
RESTRICTED
Mr Bullock
separate copies
Mr O'Keeffe
Mr Larmour
0.0.
Mr Young
:
I had a short talk this morning with Mr Rowlands about the Dependent Territories. He would like to receive from Heads of Department a note on each of the Colonial territories setting out the essential background of such matters as constitutional status, the economic and financial position and indicating the main current problems. I should be grateful if these could be sent direct to Mr Young as soon as possible. After reading them Mr Rowlands proposes to ask each Head of Department to come in for a talk.
2. I should like the notes to include Hong Kong, Gibraltar and the Falkland Islands, notwithstanding the responsibilities carried by other Ministers for those territories, in order to provide Mr Rowlands with the full Dependent Territories scenario.
Dua Wation
17 June 1975
RESTRICTED
Duncan Watson
PS/PUS
Flag A
1.
THIS IS A COPY
THE ORIGINAL HAS BEEN RETAINED IN THE DEPARTMENT UNDER SECTION
3(4) OF THE PUBLIC RECORDS ACT 1958
TOP SECRET
28
In O'Keefe
Sir
before
семье
7. Palliser read
Medin
19/0
BRIEFING FOR SIR M PALLISER'S VISIT TO HONG KONG
Your minute of 1 October recorded two points on which
Sir Michael Palliser wanted further information.
This is given below: but for obvious reasons it would be advisable for this submission to be returned, together with the additional brief on long-range planning, before Sir Michael leaves on his tour.
Benefit to this country
2.
I have been unable to find any record of an attempt in the past to quantify the financial value to Britain of our connection with Hong Kong and have, on Lord Goronwy-Roberts's instructions, commissioned such a study in connection with the long-range plannin study. Preliminary indications are that it will be impossible to quantify the value of our invisible transactions with the Colony. It may, however, be possible to arrive at figures for other items in the account e.g. in respect of the advantage we gain from the fact that Kai Tak is the second largest British airport and is thus a valuable asset in our air service negotiations world-wide.
As the
additional brief on long-range planning indicates, we on the whole expect the positive advantages to Britain to decline over the next two decades.
3.
When the planning papers were considered at an Office meeting under Lord Goronwy-Roberts's chairmanship on 11 September, it was agreed that the strongest argument in favour of the retentio of Hong Kong, and one which probably outweighs any nice calculation of positive advantages and identifiable disadvantages, is the contingent immigration liability if the status quo ceases to hold, particularly if this is the result of the use of force by China. This is to be emphasised in the final paper we will be preparing for the Secretary of State after we have had a chance to show the outline papers to the Governor during his forthcoming visit to
London.
ม
/Contingent
TOP SECRET
Tage lu
THIS IS A COPY
THE ORIGINAL HAS BEEN RETAINED
IN THE DEPARTMENT UNDER SECTION
3(4) OF THE PUBLIC RECORDS ACT 1958
TOP SECRET
Contingent Immigration Liability
4.
In 1973, the Governor agreed, as a fact of political life as well as normal practice, that if Hong Kong were no longer to be a dependency those of its inhabitants now possessing British citizenship and who remained in Hong Kong would cease to enjoy it: the important thing was that we should not say so at this stage since every such inhabitant would say they wished to leave and the current confidence in Hong Kong, which depends in large degree on the British connection, would be shattered. However, while I agree that nothing at all should be said in public about this question, I believe that the fundamentals of the case might not be as simple as the Governor apparently did in 1973. Even if we could assume a negotiated transfer of sovereignty to China in due course, there might well be considerable political repercussions for the British Government of the day at the handing over of so many British subjectí to Communism. Moreover, even if this difficulty could be surmounted in general, there would remain the special and acute problem of British subjects to whom we owe a particular debt (for instance, in the Government service and the police) whom we could scarcely leave behind but might have difficulty in absorbing here. These are variously estimated at between 50,000 and 250,000; and for planning purposes we have assumed a range of between 100,000 and 200,000. (I should emphasise that only a few of the 21 million British subjects have a right of abode in this country at present; and the extent of our obligation towards them and others in a similar position elsewhere is currently under consideration in a Working Party meeting under Home Office chairmanship.)
5.
Hong Kong nationals of Chinese origin obtain their citizenship of the UK and Colonies by birth; by naturalisation; and by registration. The first is by far the largest category since there are 80,000 children born annually who automatically acquire British citizenship. There is a complicated procedure for naturalisation which basically follows the pattern in all colonial dependencies: to be accepted those concerned must be of good character; must have lived in Hong Kong for five years out of the preceding seven with the intention of continuing to reside in Hong
and must be assimilated to the Hong Kong British way of life.
/Applications
Kong;
TOP SECRET
TU