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comers. I stressed to him that in any talks he might have about the comparisons of prices he should keep in mind that the Anglo/Italian "ceiling price" was just that and that they were fairly confident that unless there was further unprecedented escalation (which would affect everybody) their actual price would be comparable with the Japanese "pre-emptive bid". I also suggested to him that there was little point in trying to take any initiative at this stage either in public or private discussion to try to alter the Hong Kong Government's "commercial" decision. We could only warn them of the risks of the Japanese pulling a fast one and leave them to it. Meanwhile, although it was fair comment to point out the effect this might have on the way sone is look on Hong Kong, it was necessary to avoid implying that HMG's attitude would be altered on eg, BEC/GSP.
3. I was fairly confident that these points had got home to him; indeed I hardly needed to make them in the event because it so happened that during the luncheon he had a long discussion with John Weedon of GEC and with Elliot of Scott Wilson and Kirkpatrick, both of whom from their different points of view expressed their strong opinion that it was naive of the Hong Kong Government to take the Japanese bid at its face value and that if negotiations had continued with the Anglo/Italians as well as the Japanese the Hong Kong Government might well have finished up with a better, more realistic, offer from the Anglo/Italians. Others also present at the luncheon volunteered the personal view that the Japanese could not be trusted and that it would be a pity if Hong Kong gave the contract to Japan in the event al though they also felt that the Hong Kong Government must eventually go for whatever would give the best bargain.
4.
During my absence the story continued to bubble in the press on two separate but related points. I enclose copies of the reports.
5. First there were the suggestions that Japan would not be able to keep to the price and were in fact already trying to increase it. These led to a firm refutation by Newbigging of Jardines who expressed confidence that the contract would be settled at the price quoted and denied that there was any significance in the apparent delay in completing the Letter of Intent. A Government spokesman gave some support to this presumably to dampen down the press speculation.
6. The second aspect was the question of alleged Eritish "sulkiness" over the Hong Kong Government's decision. I have already sent you separately a copy of the Hong Kong Standard editorial of 14 January to which I referred in paragraph 2 of my Creda. I enclose a copy of an Editorial in the South China Morning Post which like the Standard although in a different tone rejects the implication that liong Kong should apply any thing but strict commercial considerations, and its own unfettered judgement to a major decision such as this. Both Editorials in my view serve to illustrate how myopicly self righteous the Editorials (and Hong Kong opinion) can be. It is difficult to resist the temptation to think that they have in fact only been given or, for whatever reason, choose only to see one side of the picture. The trouble is here that the Anglo/Italian side including (particularly) myself have felt constrained from entering the public lists argments to put their side of the story; the field has been left to the Hong Kong Government and the Japanese side.
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