CONFI DENTI AL
and improved logistic supplies.
4. Mr Hattersley asked whether the South Vietnamese Army could hold a general offensive at 1972 levels. Mr Bac said this was difficult to say. In 1972 they had had US air support. They could certainly hold at the present level of military activity but a general offensive would be very hard to meet. The North Vietnamese had not yet committed their air force over the South and the South Vietnamese had therefore air
superiority. He did not believe that there would be a North Vietnamese offensive until Hanoi judged that the situation was ripe, for instance if they felt that there was dwindling US support for the South, if the economy deteriorated, or if there was popular discontent which they could exploit. But provided the US continued to support them he thought they could manage despite the current critical economic situation.
Mr Bac Mr Hattersley enquired what sort of US support he meant. said that first there was military aid within the terms of the Paris Agreement, notably replacement supply of equipment on a one for one basis, whether aircraft or ammunition; this amounted to about one billion dollars. Secondly there was economic aid which was necessary to make the country self-supporting as soon as possible. They did not wish to be dependent on foreign aid, but could not do without it so long as the burden of a huge army had to be carried because of North Vietnamese military pressure. An enhanced economic aid programme of say $800 million per annum could bring the economy to take-off point within
3 4 years.
There would be no need for military aid at all if North
5.
Vietnam would respect the Paris Agreement and cease its military pressure. He believed that Dr Kissinger was to present a 5-year plan to the Congress shortly.
6. Mr Hattersley asked about the passage in the US/Soviet communiqué about improvements in the situation in Indo-China. Mr Bac said he could see no signs of recent improvements so far as South Vietnam was concerned but he was not entirely sceptical. The communiqué did not
tell the whole story; there must have been some discussion of the subject. Mr Hattersley asked how much influence the USSR really had in Hanoi. Mr Bac said the USSR was the principal armourer but unless it threatened totally to cut off supplies its influence was limited. Mr Hattersley said dramatic action by the Soviet Union was not a real option for them. Mr Pac agreed and thought the Soviet Union neverthe- less could exercise influence but only up to a point. The wording of
/the
CONFIDENTIAL