-
rule which obliges the prosecution in tendering a confessional
statement to introduce the whole of such statement even though it
may contain exculpatory matter can be extended so as to oblige the
prosecution to introduce every separate statement in a series of
statements made at any stage of the investigation to anybody conected
with the prosecution merely because certain of such statements have
specifically been relied upon at the trial. Finally on this int
it should be observed that the fact that the appellant in his £catement
to Dr. Pang would appear to have focussed upon the hour of 5.30 p.m. as though that were the hour of the killing (a fact which on 113 own might possibly support an inference of innocence) is of very stall
importance in view of the fact that the statement to Dr. Pang ras
made by the appellant subsequent to the committal proceedings in the
course at which the appellant had the opportunity of apprising
himself fully of the nature of the case being made against him. It
is inconceivable that at the end of those proce.dings the appellant
could have been in any doubt that the time which was regarded by the
prosecution as the time of the killing was between 1 and 2 p.m If
indeed it was true that in his statement to Dr. Pang the appell ant
appeared to regard the vital hour as being between 5.30 p.m. ard
7.00 p.m. that can readily be explained as being directed to the part of the
period covered by his alibi of which he considered he had the trongest
evidence to support him. It should be noted however that his wife was,
in fact, never called.
Counsel then complained that although the learned Chief Justice had warned the jury that if they did not accopt Mr. Edgley's testimony they were not entitled to convict on the other circur stantial factors upon which the Crown relied and that even if they were satisfied that the Crown had proved his alibi to be unsubstantial that they nevertheless were not entitled to convit him upon his having 'old
lies in that regard, he nevertheless had failed to point out tlat if they were left in reasonable doubt as to whether or not his alibi had been broken they likewise must acquit. It is true that the learned Chief Justice did not put the matter to the jury in so many words but the point is insubstantial. The jury had been warned in the usual way that they must not convict if they entertained a reasonable doubt as to the guilt of the accused. It is scarcely conceivable that if they did entertain a reasonable doubt as to whether
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