in Parliament.
This could initially be evaded, as in
the case of Tsoi, by the use of the residual
prerogative of mercy. But this would again mean
overruling you publicly, and the problem might again
only be postponed. Postponement would not be valueless
for UK/Hong Kong relations, but Ministers themselves
would be faced with a difficult choice from the
beginning. This in itself could affect the
relationship.
3.
The remaining option, of transferring your
prerogative to London, could be achieved without
consulting Parliament by amending the Letters Patent
and Royal Instructions; but again Ministers would have
to face the initial and recurrent problem both here and
with Hong Kong. From many points of view this would seem
the worst solution.
4.
If therefore Executive Council agree that the
main need is to avoid damage to the relationship, then
provided that they also accept the implications, your
two options might be the best. Automatic commutation
in Hong Kong would avoid the issue becoming one of
UK/Hong Kong relations. A variation might be to reprieve
Liu Chu and then wait and see. I realise that this
might be repugnant to you, but it would in fact be
constitutionally more correct, and would at the least
postpone a conflict.
5.
In either event, however, the underlying aim of
avoiding an issue in the UK would require either "no
public comment on your reasons for commutation, or no
more than an acknowledgement of the importance of the
relationship to Hong Kong. To say that the reprieve
was caused by the state of affairs in the UK could provoke
the debate which the whole exercise would be designed to
/avoid.
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