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Social programmes
CONFIDENTIAL
14. These long term programmes in Housing, Education, Social Welfare and Medical and Health Services announced in 1972 and '73 are gathering way nicely. They continue to receive a lot of public attention and I think have helped the attitude of the population to the Government, though of course at the price of heightened expectation. But they will take some time to have much impact on the ground.
15. We have followed a policy of submitting the official plans to scrutiny and amendment by mixed boards under unofficial chairmanship, and submitting the boards' reports, in the form of "green papers", to wide public debate, stimulated through Government Information Services. This is to maintain interest during the planning period and until the progress of the programmes can become self-evident, and partly because in this apparently autocratic form of Government it is a way of achieving public participation and consent. It is immensely time- consuming, but I believe worthwhile.
16. We will press on with these programmes in 1974 and much depends on our doing so. However, they were adopted and programmed on the assumption of a stable tax structure and a 7 per cent growth rate of the economy in real terms. The oil crisis might call this in question. I think we can hold our course in 1974, but should a recession be precipitated, the timing, if not the principles, of these programmes may have to be reconsidered.
Crime
17. The rapid increase in violent crime over the last three or four years had frightened the population to a point at which their faith in the Government was seriously undermined. The problem was compounded by an extraordinary lack of confidence and communication between the public and the police, by a feeling of helplessness on the part of the public, by chronic under-manning of the police force and an evident sense of frustration and even bewilderment amongst its upper echelon. As a substantial part of the Government's time and political credit in 1973 was committed to an attempt to reverse this situation, I record it at some length.
18. We planned to break out of this situation by a series of cumulative moves. Firstly, we doubled the size of the Auxiliary Force as the quickest method of reinforcing the regulars and creating a bridge between police and public. This went well. Simultaneously a through-going reform of police procedures in dealing with the public was instituted, relevant laws and punishments were slightly stiffened, and the people themselves were directly involved by insistent propaganda and by the formation of a network of committees to educate the public in ways of protecting themselves and helping the police. At this point the first thing went wrong, in that the attention of the Press and public were distracted by the reprieve, on the advice of Her Majesty's Government of Tsoi, condemned to death for the murder of an Auxiliary policeman defending his family against armed burglary.
19. When the numbers of the Auxiliaries had reached the necessary level, an action phase commenced in which the police made a massive effort to smother crime by putting every available man on the beat, and the public was exhorted to help them in various specified ways. The action phase had an instantaneous effect in sending criminals to ground, raising the prestige of the police and reviving public confidence in the ability and determination of the police and Government to fight crime. On the crest of this comparative success we proceeded to the next stage, which was a massive recruitment campaign for the regular police. However,
CONFIDENTIAL
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