THIS IS A COPY.......................
THE ORIGINAL HAS BEEN RETAINED IN THE DEPARTMENT UNDER SECTION
3(4) OF THE PUBLIC RECORDS ACT 1958
I did.
~L.K.
-
policy was to call in troops sooner, rather than later.
I asked the Governor to assess the risk in terms of the
I minimum number of major units he considered necessary. pointed out that the Chiefs of Staff would prefer to reduce force levels to the smalle st acceptable Garrison and the Government would prefer the smallest possible bill. I also pointed out that, during recent years, the acceptable minimum number of Units had been reduced from nine to eight and then to 6 2/3rds and that a further temporary
I asked particularly reduction of one unit had been accepted.
about the value of the three RAF Hunter aircraft in view of the expensive overheads involved.
The Governor emphasised the importance of the Garrison for maintaining the confidence of the local population. If, as a result of reductions in the size of the Garrision, doubt arose about British intentions or about our ability to retain control of Hong Kong, confidence would begin to collapse and there would be a turning towards Peking. If all the British Troops were withdrawn, he estimated that the Colony would be
The Governor said that the quickly taken over by China.
Garrison should be considered in terms of its deterrent value, rather than attempting to assess its potential defensive capability, He said that he believed that the presence of the Garrison had an influence on United States policy in the Far East.
The Governor said that, in the present circumstances of our commitments towards Malaysia, he was prepared to co-operate and accept the risk of temporary reductions in the Garrison, provided that the principle of maintaining a Garrison of 6 2/3rds major units in Hong Kong remai ned unquestioned. On the particular question of the RAF Hunters, the Governor said that they were necessary, not only for the maintenance of confidence, but also to discourage encroachment into Hong Kong air space.
TOP SECRET