TOP SECRET & PERSONAL
8 March 1965
I mentioned to you on the telephone on Friday that I had had from David Trench a report of his conversations with Lard Mountbatten. I now enclose an extract from his letter and Lord Mountbatten's record of his meeting with the Governor and the CRF,
I agree with you that there can be no real danger of the Government even contemplating a complete withdrawal from Hong Kong, and I think that the live issues are therefore whether there can be any reduction in the existing garrison without seriously imperilling our position or, alternatively, whether Hong Kong could be cajoled or compelled inte paying more to the UK Exchequer as a defence contribution.
Since we spoke, VCDS has telephoned me, obviously in some embarrassment at the turn things have taken, He agrees that the last thing we want is a farmal Whitehall study of the importance of Hong Kong, but he thought it would be necessary for the Ministry of Defence to produce, for their owTI purposes, something which could be used as a brief for their Secretary of State during the discussion on the Defence Review. Sir Alfred Karle thought that the pressure that would have to be countered would be for a reduction of the garrison and not for complete withdrawal. He agreed that the study that the Chiefs of Staff have recently completed was a complete answer from the military point of view, but thought that the best course would be to mit and see the paper that the CBF was preparing, va Lord Mountbatten's instruction. The Colonial Office could then decide whether to call for the Governor's comments once the Ministry of Defence had decided what to do with the draft and how to process it. ́s regards the question of an additional defence contribution, although, when we were briefing Mr Mayhew for the debate on the 19th January on the 9th Report of the Select Committee on the ɛstimates, he made it very clear to us that he thought thure ma a very strong case for Hong Kong paying more, I was told by Tony Feck the other day that there wa no intention of pursuing this particular matter, at least for the time being.
I shall be talking again to the Hinistry of Defence early this week about all this, but I thought you would like to have the documentation in case the question comes up and I have to œll you in aid urgently.
I should þerhaps mention that in the letter to which Savid Tronoh's is a reply I had mentioned that Lord Lountbatten would be putting to him the
question of whether it was sbsolutely essential to maintain the three Hunters, As you know the Chiefs of Staff were by no means as firm on this point as on the maintenance of the gerrison at 6j major units. On this point David Trench'a views are:-
C.M. NacLEMODE, ESC., CHC, MAX,
MBS,
Foreign Office,
TOP SECRET & PERSONAL
★ There is of course FP (A) (59) 3 Revise, which is a useful paper
tarsity be brought up to date.
The
that ed
fairly