SECRET
ANNEX: NON-NATO COMMITMENTS
:
FIVE POWER DEFENCE ARRANGEMENTS
1.
The paper provides for us to leave no more than the
5-man contribution to the Integrated Air Defence System and
to maintain our commitment to consult in the event of aggression
if our partners so wished. This suggests that a decision to
maintain our consultative commitment is dependent upon the
further wishes of our partners. We know that they wish us
to maintain our commitment. We should be prepared to state
now our intention to maintain it. As was agreed in OPD,
our negotiator should be given some flexibility in considering
specific requests from our Allies for a small residual
presence.
OMAN/MASTRAI
2.
Before a
The reference to Masirah is unsatisfactory.
decision about withdrawal is taken we will need to consult
the Americans about the importance they attach to the
intelligence facilities on the island. We will also need
to consult the Omanis and Iranians and take account of their
We should aim for a reduction in the RAF presence
rather than a total withdrawal.
CYPRUS
reactions.
3.
The Americans may well object to a British decision to
withdraw from the SBAS, arguing both that the intelligence
SECRET
/obtained