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afternoon.
3.
However, the Prime Minister is supported by the Chancellor of the Exchequer in his desire for as much detail as possible in the statement, and I think we must assume that we shall be under pressure to include as much as possible and that omission of mention of our plans for any particular commitment will be the exception rather than the rule. On this basis I should be grateful if you would start considering the form which brief's for the Secretary of State for 20 November and for the subsequent messages to Governments might take.
4. I suggest that briefs should have a common form and should comprise:-
(a) A suggested form of words for use in the Parliamentary
statement; or arguments why there should be no mention of the commitment, as appropriate.
(b) An indication of the level of the messages to the
Governments concerned.
(c) The timing of these messages.
(a) The content of these messages.
(e) The form and scope of any subsequent discussion.
Where departments are concerned with more than one Government, I suggest that the information in (b) to (e) above be given in column form.
5. I suggest that drafting of the necessary messages be started now, as far as this is possible, but that we wait until nearer the time of the Cabinet meeting to see whether it is necessary for us to attach the drafts to the Secretary of State's briefs.
6. In general there are perhaps few cases in which we have over- riding grounds for continuing to resist any mention of our plans in the Parliamentary statement. Oman is one of them. In the case of Hong Kong else we may have to accept that Ministers will wish to say at least that there would be consultations with the Hong Kong Government about the level of forces appropriate in the present circumstances and about how the cost of these forces should be divided in future, in addition to a general reference to our intention to maintain our obligations towards Dependent Territories.
/Over
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