SECRET AND STRIVINI
I DIDUM 1
91
Foreign and Commonwealth Office London SW1
Telephone 01-
HE Sir Murray MacLehose KCMG MBE HONG KONG
A
Your reference
Our reference
Date
30 August 1974
A
Dear Rurous,
DEFENCE REVIEW
1.
CardT
REF.
NEXT
DEF.
97)
We spoke about the present state of play. You said you had already made the two points that the 100% concept was not on and that there would be disastrous consequences in Hong Kong if HMG tried to insist upon it. It was up to the FCO to assert the truth of these propositions and you did not think there was much to be gained by further discussions here before you went back to Hong Kong. I concurred and we agreed that there was no need, before your return, for us to discuss the latest telegrams with you. You would be able, if you thought it right, to telegraph us before the next PUS's meeting on Tuesday.
2.
In fact I think we have been able to achieve some sort of balance in presentation. I attach an extract from the latest Steering Committee paper which I think not wholly unsatisfactory. (This should of course be treated with the greatest discretion and not referred to either directly or by implication in communications with London.)
(B)
3.
Apart from the general issue, there is the question how the no-reinforcement and reinforcement options should be costed. This is the subject of the latest llong Kong telegram no. 876. The situation is complicated by the fact that the MOD have been using different figures from those of your local Service representatives. However,
However, the latest draft paper shows the promint cost of forces at £42 m. and the cost of options 1(A) and as £38 m. and £37 m. - £41.5 m. (depending on the ultimate cost of a reinforcement capability) respectively (extract also enclosed). The only estimate that has therefore been increased is that of the reinforcement option. There remains the problem of getting the estimated cost down towards £34 m. in order to support the 50% £17 m. thesis. We are working at this.
4.
Unfortunately the MOD) figures assume that the two British infantry battalions would remain at full strength (there is some Army Dept opposition to the idea of keeping them at minimum manning strengths). This seems to us to be a retrograde step
presentationally, because it implies that the Governor is not willing to make any reductions at all in the notional strength of his teeth units. We shall strive to have this corrected before the paper goes to Ministers.
co Nr. Jackson, Defence Dept.
Mr Male
Yous ever
Andow
AC Bluort
Hong Kong & Indian Ccen