SECRET
forces there prior to withdrawal.
we
There are good miltary reasons, in the Defence Review context, for reducing them as soon as possible, and can agree with the Steering Committee's suggestion that some force reduction might be made between 1977 and 1979; Mr Mintoff told the Defence Secretary in June that he realised that there would be some tapering off of the British presence towards the end of the period of the Agreement.
But Mr Mintoff clearly hopes that this tapering off will be postponed as long as possible, so as to avoid any early or sudden loss of revenue to Malta from the local expenditure of British forces (currently running at about £15 million a year). We must avoid a major row over this. Given Mr Mintoff's temperament and Malta's economic needs, it could easily escalate out of all proportion to the money involved; Significant reductions should not therefore take place before 1977. "Officials should be instructed to work out a plan for force reductions in the period 1977/79 accordingly.
I
Gibraltar (paragraph 37)
The case for retaining our present military presence in Gibraltar rests very largely on IIMG's commitment to "support and sustain" the people of Gibraltar. Expenditure by UK Departments (notably MOD expenditure on the dockyard) accounts for some 60 per cent of Gibraltar's economic activity. OPD (74) 23 points out that as long as Gibraltar remains an issue between us and Spain (and indeed there appears to be virtually no pros- pect of an acceptable settlement with Spain in the foreseeable future), there is no escape from this commitment, although some marginal reductions in the garrison might be possible.
Officials should be instructed to make such marginal
savings as they can.
Caribbean and South Atlantic (paragraph 38)
The Falkland Islands
OPD (74) 23 observes that the cost of the detachment
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