SECRET
shaking local confidence in the Arrangements.
Indian Ocean (paragraph 31)
General
The intention behind OPD (74) 23 is that, within the cost of the Critical Level, our naval presence east of the Cape of Good Hope would be able to continue on the group
operating system, though perhaps more intermittently than at
present. Inasmuch as we would need any facilities in the area
we would rely on Simonstown, on the expanded US facilties
at Diego Garcia and on any residual facilities in Singapore. However, we must bear in mind the need to avoid reducing our commitments in a way which would increase the likelihood of the Russians filling the gaps created, The Americans will be particularly interested in this, in view of their growing interest in the area. The Secretary of "tate should make these
points as necessary.
Gan
OPD (74) 23 recommends that we give up Gan by 1976. We can agree to this. However, a significant increase in our aid to the Maldivian Government might be necessary, particularly
if it were consiered desirable to retain a lien on the airfield
facilities to prevent them being taken over by other powers. This could be in the order of £1m a year for a period of four
years.
Mauritius
OPD (74) 23 recommends that our forces ie the ground communications station, HMS Mauritius, be withdrawn from Mauritius by 1976. We can agree. The Mauritians will probably press for compensation but we should be able to resist this.
OPD (74) 23 does not mention the future of the Anglo/ Mauritian Defence Agreement, under which we have a commitment to consult with the Government of Mauritius the event of any
internal or external threat. We think the Agreement might have to be maintained and it would be helpful if the Secretary of
No forces would State were to put down a marker to this effect.
3
in
/be provided