2
2.
Ministers in effect accepted the argument
that the forces technically judged necessary should be maintained, but thought that a fifty per cent contribution was too low. The situation is therefore broadly as in para. 1(B) of your tel. under reference. However, this does not mean that you and CBF cannot now review your recommendations about force levels, to see whether further economies compatible with Hong Kong's safety may not be possible, to bring costs down to a level where your £17 m. and Ministers seventy-five per cent may be more closely compatible.
what we hope you will now do.
3.
Indeed this is
(Your para. 2) All options in the defence review are open, but for the purposes of this exercise your assumption that Gurkha units will continue to be available is correct.
4.
(Your para. 3). Any reinforcement would have to be in slow time by charter and would depend on the availability of forces. In any sudden crisis there would therefore be no reinforcement. For planning purposes we must also assume that this would normally be the case even when the crisis was foreseen.
5.
(Your para. 4) Present Ministers would wish to consider the question immediately after the election. This means that the steering committee must prepare . contingency papers at the beginning of October. We
must therefore regretfully ask for your advice by 2 October.
6.
Following meeting with Haddon-Cave we have fed in the thought that you would prefer not to get involved in formal consultations about the defence contribution in 1976 and until this year's budget is out
If so grateful for
of the way.
Is this correct?
your advice on timing.
SECRET
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