X
be a rather empty one.
It could hardly escape the notice not
only of the Mauritian Government but of its enemies, whether
external or internal, that having terminated our local presence
we should find it physically extremely difficult to give
practical military assistance if called on to do so. The MOD
view is that we should negotiate the termination of the
commitment (which was in origin a quid pro quo for the right
to have a communications station there) when we withdraw.
? lara
Kenya
13. A similar problem arises in relation to Kenya because of
the Bamburi Understanding which the Prime Minister, at the
request of the Kenyans, recently reaffirmed. When we have
withdrawn stationed forces from Masirah, Gan, Mauritius and
probably Cyprus, it must be plain to the Kenyans, and to others,
that while we might be willing to have consultations with Kenya
if she were attacked, there would be very little we could do for
her in the way of practical military assistance.
Whether or not
we should have been prepared to do so in the past in the event,
the credibility of the Understanding must be reduced by the
decisions of the Defence Review. The Sub-Committee ought
therefore to consider whether Ministers should be advised to
cxtend consultation on the Defence Review to Kenya. Since the
Bamburi Understanding has so recently been reaffirmed it would
be difficult to terminate it formally, but it might be desirable
to explain to President Kenyatta that the practical assistance
we could give (as distinct from counsel) would necessarily be
very small indeed.
SECRET
/Five Power