!
next three-year forecast, due on 1 April 1975, it would
not have to be presented as a major change to the present
forecast, and the ground for argument would be reduced in
scope.
7. On past form Mr. Mintoff can be expected to oppose
strenuously and noisily any reductions, but with a vigour
roughly related to their severity. NATO is unlikely to welcome,
in conjunction with our other proposals, cuts which could
provoke Mr. Mintoff into very sharp opposition. Therefore it
might be unwise to attempt, in an effort to minimise the cost
to us of Malta, to cut our presence too savagely, unless we
were prepared to stand quite firm in face of Mintoff and NATO
opposition, and put up with any retaliatory measures Mr. Mintoff
might use against us.
8. Unless Ministers felt that we should take that stand, and
be prepared, as we have nearly done before (but with NATO on
our side) to move out completely if necessary, it would be better
not to risk an ignominious retreat before Mr. Mintoff. In these
circumstances it would be preferable to take as our starting
point no significant reductions until 1977/78, and a progressive
run-down during the final two years of the agreement. We shoulä
in negotiation no doubt be pressed to delay this run-down as
late as possible. As the period becomes shorter, the room for
concessions, and hence for embarrassment, is sharply reduced.
SECRET
19.