DEVIMI JA BLVD A
to the forces not all being required for a higher
priority task at the same time.
f.
Although for political reasons it may be desirable
to drop the Brunei commitment as soon as possible, if the
retention of a garrison in Hong Kong is judged politically
necessary, the military implications of withdrawal from
Brunei will have to be considered in assessing the Hong
Kong force level, since a battalion in Brunei affects both
the reinforcement levels and timings for Hong Kong. Indeed
it would be necessary to establish whether the 51 unit
level for Hong Kong, assumed above as the minimum garrison,
would remain acceptable if the Brunei reinforcement was no
longer available.
5. South Korea.
For as long as it may be required, the South
Korea commitment to provide an honour guard contribution of 22
men could continue to be met from Hong Kong force levels.
6. Brunei. Any decision to withdraw from Brunei by 1976 for
political reasons would carry with it military disadvantages
connected with Hong Kong. (See paragraph 4 above). The Hong
Kong garrison would also be deprived of an important training
and roulement outlet, which could include free Jungle Warfare
Training facilities. The Brunei Garrison costs the UK virtually
nothing.
7. Five Power Defence Agreement.
A reduced presence to
support the Five Power Defence Agreement (FPDA) until about
- 5-
SECRET UK EYES A