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But our judgement is that if we present our case skilfully and chow ourselves responsive to our Allies' views, reductions to the figure of defence spending envisaged for the critical level would not seriously damage NATO cohesion.
6. Reductions to the First Level would be politically much more serious. A good deal would depend on precisely what reductions were involved as well as on how the proposals were presented. For example, reductions in BAOR other than through an MBFR agreement would have a particularly serious effect. In general the more we can phase reductions to fit in with the plans of the LATO military authorities and of our partners the more easily they will be accepted. Before we have begun the process of consultation with our Allies it is not possible to say precisely what political penalties would be involved in cuts on the order of the First level. We must however take seriously the danger that they would be followed by unilateral American and European reactions.
7. NATO Ministers have rublicly reaffirmed both individuelly erd collectively the importance they continue to attach to the princi: le that ATO forces should not be reduced except in the context of an agreement with the East. A public indication that weight cut our NATC effort without reference to this comr on principle could seriously undermine the western negotiating position in 1 B an* the cohesion of the Western particients. It would remove the nee^ for the Russians to accert reductions in their own forces in order to secure cuts in FATO forces.
8. Our Allies, and the major NATO Comranders, would be likely to share the Chiefs of Staff view that the reductions the Chiefs envisage to meet the First Level would invalidate NATO's present strategy. What could be done in these circumstances could only be determined in a separate study which would require co-ordination with our Allies; but it seems likely that major changes in the structure of Western defence would be required. The point is not only that reductions of this order would leave serious gaps ir th total military effort (and we could not expect cur allies simply to take on the burden we were laying down:indeed they could well follow suit), but that they would seriously shake political confidence. This is not a judrement that refers only to British reductions. If other major NATO countries e.g. Germany or the United States did the same, the result would be equally serious.
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