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Strategic Nuclear Deterrent
[Paras 48-52 included only in certain copies]
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Consultation
52. Ministers have undertaken to consult fully with our allios where their interests are directly involved. We shall also need to consult, or inform, Governments concerned with our commitments outside NATO.
53. Full and timely oonsultation with NATO is essential. Whatever level of savings Ministers choose to make, a substantial out in our NATO contribution will be involved, This will oreate two dangers. First, the confidence of our allies in NATO will be affected if they regard our outs as endangering the viability of NATO strategy. Secondly, some of our allies who are under strong pressures to reduce their contributions as a result of domestic opinion or their own economic situation, may feel obliged by our example to yield to those pressures. In particular the Americans, whose contribution is vital to the security of the Alliance, and therefore to the cohesion of NATO, have warned us of the consequences for them if we are seen to be making major reductions. Dr Schlesinger has warned us that suoh reductions, particularly if they involve outs in BAOR, would certainly be followed by Amerioan withdrawals, At the Summit 'Meeting on 26 June President Nixon renewed his pledge that the United · States would maintain and improve their forces in Europe, provided .
that a similar effort was forthcoming from their European allies.
51
There is thus
骨
oritical level for our contribution to NATO in
politioql as woll af in military terms. The two levels do not
necessarily coincide,
The critical level in political terms depends
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