have said that "MTO As the linch-pin of our security and will remain the first charge on the resources made available for defence," We therefore began by considering what would be the minimum British contribution in terms of force levels and capabilities which would meet our basic NATO commitments and be consistent with the continued viability of MTO strategy.
14. The threat to Western Europe is essentially one of Soviet politico/ military pressure: the Soviet Union, by applying political, economic, subversive and military means of influence, may be able to achieve its aim of progressively altering the balance of power in Europe in its favour, without resort to hostilities. The Soviet Union has achieved virtual nuclear parity with the United States. In Europe the Warsaw Pact has a marked numerical superiority over the Alliance in manpower and conventional weapons, The Soviet Union has a large modern fleet of surface vessels and a submarine force which out-numbers that of NATO by nearly two to one. One third of the Soviet defence budget is spent on R and D so that Warsaw Pact forces will continue to be equipped with the most modern weapons. To meet this throat NATO adopted in 1967 a strategy based on the concepts of deterrence (ultimately that of the strategic nuclear deterrent), flexibility in response and forward defence. To be effective NATO requires a credible capability at each level of conflict the conventional, the tactical nuclear and the strategio in any part of the NATO area, and the United States in particular has emphasised the need for NATO to have a conventional capability sufficient to ensure that the decision to use nuclear weapons should not have to be faced at a very early stage in a conflict.
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15. The present strategy of Flexibility in response and forward defence is the right one for NATO, in political and military terms, today. It must be kept under review in the light of developments in the threat. If negotiations with the Warsaw Pact on MBPR result in an agreement, some reduction in NATO forces will be possible. But this apart, we see no prospect at present of Allied agreement on a viable alternative strategy which would permit significant force reductions in particular on a return to a strategy involving greater dependence on the early use of nuclear weapons, such as the "tripwire strategy" which was abandoned by MTO in 1967 because it lacked credibility. It would in any case be awkward for us to advocate a review of strategy now, without appoaring to our Allies to be using this as a device for furthering our own wish to reduce the cost of our NATO contribution.
16. Our forces are no larger than those of our main European Allies, except for the Royal Navy (see Annex A). But we provide a wide range of capabilities and, alone among the European countries, contribute to the defence of all three regions of Allied Command Europe (the Centre and the Northern and Southern flanks). Under the revised Brussels Treaty of 1954 we are obliged to maintain on the mainland of Europe 55,000 men and a tactical air force, or such forces as SACEUR regards as having equivalent fighting capacity. The main elements
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