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3. The new version of para 34 implies that the loss of Magiwah would be a corollary of our ceasing to provide assistance in the Dhofar campaign. As I see it, this is a misapprehension. If the reduction of our assistance in Dhofar is carried out as originally envisaged, i.e. pari passu with success in the campaign and not including other forms of assistance e.g. seconded officers (as the new draft could be taken to imply), there is no reason why it should have any effect on our position at Masirah.
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4. I hope that it may be possible to get the amendment deleted from the latest draft. The danger I foresee is that if it stands, the abandonment of Masirah may come to be seen as a desirable objective rather than as an unwelcome consequence of the economies actually proposed. If it were announced in · such terms in the eventual Defence Review conclusion: this would look like a political decision to withdraw our support from Oman, and could have serious repercussions both on international. security and on our relations with her neighbours. The political case for continuing to assist Oman is of course that a defeat in Dhofar could undermine the stability of the Gulf from which Britain draws over two-thirds of its oil supplies. It seems unfortunate
that such considerations are not even mentioned in the paper, although the political arguments are included in the paragraphs about some other territories.
5.
Incidentally the passage about ending the commitment of our V-bomber force to CENTO seems to have dropped out. Is this deliberate or an oversight? It is more important than the remarks about CENTO that have been retained.
Mamir
M S Weir
15 July 1974
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