30.
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Five Power Defence Arrangements At the minimun we would confirm the consultative commitment and leave only our contribution (5 men) to the integrated air defence aystem.
31.
Indian Ocean
Forces could be withdrawn from Gan and Mauritius by 1976; minimum support for residual Indian Ocean tasks could be provided by transferring the necessary facilities and manpower to Diego Garcia, if we agree to the American request to expand the facilities, which would be for joint use, at their own expense.
32.
Oman We should continue to aim at ending our military involvement in the Sultan's war against the rebels as soon as we can do so in a way acceptable to the Iranians, Saudi Arabia and the Americans. The loss of the airfield and facilities at Masirah would have to be accepted.
33. Sharjah The British Military Assistance team will be withdrawn during 1975.
34. CENTO We could, at negligible cost, continue our membership of the Military Committee and retain the United Kingdom Permanent Military Deputy and the attached officers.
35. Cyprus Cyprus provides our most important intelligence gathering base outside the United Kingdom and Germany. Our facilities are mostly inside our 2 Sovereign Base Areas (SBAs). The product is of great value to us and to the United States and the major part of it is of direct value to NATO. Our position in Cyprus is also important to the cohesion of NATO's southern Flank; our withdrawal from either or both of our SEAs would be likely to lead to severe tension between Greece, Turkey and Cyprus. The possibility of regrouping our intelligence facilities has been examined, and it seems most unlikely that this could be done without a major loss of the product and/or financial and political difficulties with the Cyprus Government. This points to the need to retain our 2 SBAS, but with a somewhat reduced military presence, In view of the high cost (it is unlikely that this solution would reduce the present figure or £38 million to less than £25 million) Ministers may wish to be provided with a detailed study before deciding whether the commitment should be retained.
36. Malta We retain forces and facilities in Malta out of regard for NATO opinion. The present Agreement with Mintoff continues until 1979. If we withdrew
our main forces before then he would certainly make an issue of the matter and might seek to take us to the International Court for breach of agreement. We would also have difficulty with our NATO allies, who cover the larger part of the subsidy paid to Malta in return for the facilities. Some force reductions might nevertheless be made between 1977 and 1979 and the Agreement should not be renewed.
37. Gibraltar Gibraltar is no longer of any great military importance to us, although it has some value for MTO. So long as it remains an issue between us and Spain, and so long as the Spanish regime is such that we cannot in good
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