SECRET
4.
(2)
The JIC assessment reflects the same theme as that of Hong Kong Special Branch, but concludes that while the likelihood of a change in Chinese policy is not high, a power struggle in Peking could influence policy towards Hong Kong and effect actual local behaviour inside the Colony and in the Border area. Events could then erupt in outbursts of violence, such as characterised the onset of the cultural revolution, either as internal subversion leading to a campaign of urban terrorism or as pressure in a variety of forms against and across the land border. Some recognition must therefore continue to be given to the latent Chinese threat, but it must be recognised that should an organised rebellion break out which was designed to overthrow the Government and make way for a communist take- over, it would mean that all Hong Kong's policy, both internal and external, would have failed.
INTERNAL UNREST
5. Internal unrest could also arise, as in the past, from circumstances largely urrelated to the latent Chinese threat; from dissatisfaction over economic conditions and inflation; from food shortages; through the escalation of minor industrial disputes, or through agitation against Colonial rule by radical groups such as the New Left.
6. Disturbances, which stem from purely internal unrest. normally take the form of spontaneous and ill organised outbreaks of violence directed haphazardly against private and commercial property and against any symbol or manifestation of lawful authority. Sustained violence against well protected installations is unlikely as, when confronted by determined opposition, the mobs tend to turn to softer targets. At the same time the unpredictability with which violence can erupt in Hong Kong often makes this form of disorder difficult to anticipate.
BORDER VIOLATION
7. Even without any major change in Chinese policy towards Hong Kong, or any breakdown in the central Government's authority, there is a real and constant danger of the integrity of the 17 mile long border being eroded and with it, the Hong Kong Government's authority. The Chinese maintain at least three regular battalions in the immediate vacinity of the Border, plus a large number of armed militia and border guards. Moreover, some 200-300 farmers from Quan Tung Province cross the border each day to work communal farms and fish ponds in the New Territories. workers are habitually hostile to British authority and are quick to exploit any real or imagined grievance in connection with their crossing rights or communal property.
(2)' JIC(A) (73)9
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SECRET