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d.
There is a significant risk inherent in this Option. By dispensing with any reserve, other than the RHKR (V), the security of Hong Kong, in the event of simultaneous activity on the border as well as the urban areas, might entirely depend on the prompt arrival of a reinforcement battalion.
e.
Under this Option, the teeth arm strength of this reduced Garrison could be shown as 5 major units, if the armoured squadron (or close support battery) and the two engineer squadrons were counted as unit each. Hence, for presentational purposes the Garrison would not have been reduced by more than one major unit, from the 6 figure, and the Hong Kong Government would not, under the present defence costs agreement, be in a position to invoke the review clause.
f.
The attraction of this Option is that, in negotiating any future defence costs agreement, HMG would be better placed, than at present, to convince the Hong Kong Government that the Garrison was in fact specifically designed for Hong Kong's particular needs, and that the content which might seem to be largely for the UK Government's convenience, ie the all arms representation to ease the arms plot, the combined training aspect and the capability for limited war, has been reduced. Only the Flect facilities at TAMAR and 444 RAF Signals Unit might seem to be in this category.
g. Option C provides a useful fall back position from the status quo, which is always attractive in Hong Kong, but it should be remembered that this Option is not without some risks.
人人
win Varamall
2 July 1974
Commander British Forces
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