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AL....
C.
Even if two engineer troops were available for use in the infantry role, the Garrison would be 14 battalions below the minimum level of the immediate requirement (5 battalions). This could not be made good by RHKR good by RHKR(V), for the reasons given in paragraph 21b, and no reliance could be placed on getting more than two ad hoc companies from TCBG.
d. Such a cut would involve taking serious risks with the internal security of the Colony: eg initially the whole of Kowloon and the airfield at Kai Tak would together be covered by only one quite inadequate battalion. Moreover, our ability to compete with any simultaneous pressure along the border would be entirely dependent on reinforcement from outside.
e.
The disbandment of a brigade headquarters would end the established and proven police and military emergency command structure in Kowloon and, should there be simultaneous emergencies in the urban area and on the border, the remaining brigade headquarters would be unable to handle them both. It would also put considerable strain on the A/Q staff at Land Forces Headquarters and on to the command and supervisory responsibilities of Commander Land Forces and his Deputy.
f. With so few units it would become progressively more difficult and ultimately impossible to sustain the confirmed border commitment over a prolonged period. This would weaken the ability of the British Forces to prevent the erosion of the Hong Kong Government's authority in the border area and in coastal waters.
g. The reduction to one battalion in the British content of the Garrison would throw into question HMG's determination to maintain the status quo. To reduce the number of Gurkha battalions instead would be extremely uncconomical.
h. With a permanent garrison of only four units, it is unlikely that the larger number of reinforcements, which would then be even more urgently required, would be free from other commitments and available in sufficient quantity.
j. Local defence spending, aside from minor works and maint- enance met entirely by the Hong Kong Government, would be reduced from an annual £19M to £16.5M. However, as the Hong Kong Government provides £6.4 per year, and would be entitled to invoke the review clause in face of such a force reduction, there could well be no actual saving in UK budgetary costs, except through savings in personnel costs arising from any disbandments of the UK units. Indeed, if the Hong Kong Government reduced its contribution in proportion to the cut in teeth arm units (one third), HMG would be paying virtually the same local costs as before, but for a dangerously reduced Garrison, An illustration of this possibility is given in Annex C.