SECRET
51. Option B. To ignore military advice altogether and cut the Garrison by an arbitrary amount large enough to secure a significant reduction in defence expenditure in Hong Kong. Simply as an illustrative example, the implications of a reduction in the overall strength of the Garrison by 25% are worth examination:
a.
Due to the very high ratio of locally engaged civilians to military manpower in administrative units and Army administrative responsibilities for the Royal Navy and Royal Air Force, the cut would be disproportionately high in teeth arms and involve radical change in the command structure.
(1) Cuts to achieve military manpower savings of 2356 posts (25% of total MPT):
(a) One (UK) infantry battalions
(b)
(c)
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Fourth rifle companies from
the three Gurkha battalions(5)
Armoured reconnaissance squadron
(a) Artillery regiment complete
(e)
Reduction of the (UK manned) support squadron RE to a Gurkha manned troop
756 posts
399 posts
147 posts
525 posts
62 posis
(£)
Reduction in HQBF and HQLF
staffs, disbandment of one
brigade HQ and reduction in administrative units
467 posts
(g)
Total
2365 posts
(2) Such a reduction would leave a Garrison of:
(a) One (UK) infantry battalion.
(b) Three (reduced size) Gurka battalions.
(c) Two field engineer squadrons with very limited plant operating capability.
b. A cut from six to four units able to act in the infantry role must be close to the point at which public confidence would start to drain away; it might even have reached that point.
(5) Quite apart from the wasteful loss of highly cost effective troops, such a cut would cause untold difficulties with Gurkha runout, redundancy and pensions.
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