12. No-one I think disputes the need for a significant British presence and any reduction in strength (particularly of British as opposed to Gurk servicemen) could be construed locally as an ebbing away of the UK Government's interest and support and of its determination, even if it meant some financial sacrifice to itself, to keep things as they are. Indeed the argument may be more about who pays for the Garrison rather than its size.
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13. On the other hand at times of significant economic difficulties both in the UK and to a lesser extent in Hong Kong, it must be right to prune the force to the minimum consistent with being able to do the job in hand; and to leave possible future contingencies and developments to be covered by a scale of reinforcements. It would be reasonable to accept therefore that the forces found to be necessary for the urgent specific roles should be adequate to provide the necessary feeling of security, confidence and British involvement; and it would be inappropriate to take too much account of the British Forces capability to help the Hong Kong authority in the event of natural disasters, even though this greatly enhances popularity and the value of the military presence? to the community.
INTERNAL SECURITY (IS)
14. Tasks. Whether internal unrest takes the form of purely civil disturbances and riotous assemblies, or whether there are some more sinister political undertones involving the use of weapons, explosives and organised urban terrorism, the respective responsibilities of the Police and Army would be as follows:
a.
•
Police
(1) Maintenance of law and order.
(2) Protection of life and property.
(3) Collection and assessment of Special Branch intelligence.
(4). Detection and observation of dissident
.control cells.
(5) Search and arrest operations.
(6)
Imposition of curfews and movement restrictions.
(7), Riot control.
(8)
EOD.
SECRET